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A Comparison of Security Risk Analysis in the In-house IT Infrastruc-
ture and Cloud Infrastructure for the Payment Gateway System 
Abstract:  
In-house infrastructures are migrated to the cloud owing to the enhanced technical manage-
ment capabilities, technical advancement as well as the flexibility and cost-effective options 
offered by the cloud. Moreover, an enterprise architecture changes when the systems are 
moved into a different infrastructure. Due to such infrastructural changes, security risks can 
increase or decrease, while new risks can be introduced and some risks can be eliminated. 
Asset identification for risk analysis based only on business process modelling lacks the 
integration and representation of the interrelationship between IT infrastructure and business 
processes. Hence, certain information system (IS) assets can be neglected in the risk analy-
sis. When analysing the security risk of two infrastructures, enterprise architectural differ-
ences need to be captured, since unidentified IS assets could be vulnerable and pose a secu-
rity risk to the concerned organisation. 
In this thesis, assets are identified via architectural modelling to perform risk analysis. Fur-
thermore, models present the differences pertaining to IS assets within in-house infrastruc-
ture and cloud infrastructure, in addition to the mapping to corresponding business pro-
cesses. The STRIDE-based threat modelling is employed to determine the security risks 
concerning IS assets derived from enterprise architecture. 
To elaborate, this study will introduce a procedure that will help organisations identify IS 
asset changes of two different infrastructures and capture security risk changes. Moreover, 
architectural modelling applied in this research will illustrate the differences regarding IS 
assets and present the way in which business processes are mapped to technology compo-
nents. Subsequently, a threat modelling method employed will provide a structural way to 
identify threats to the systems. The changes incorporated concerning the security risks will 
further present the security risk gap regarding in-house infrastructure and cloud infrastruc-
ture. Additionally, the validation of this approach is performed by domain experts. The en-
terprise architecture modelled in this thesis is based on a case study dealing with a payment 
gateway system used in the North Europe. 
Keywords: 
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Maksekanali turvariskide võrdlev analüüs põhinedes IT infrastruktu-
urile ja pilve infrastruktuurile 
Lühikokkuvõte:  
Infrastruktuuri lahendused viiakse pilve tänu paremale juhtimisvõimekusele, seadmete 
tehnilisele arengule ning pilve lahenduste paindlikkusele ja kuluefektiivsetele võimalustele. 
Seetõttu muutub ettevõtte arhitektuur, kui süsteemid viiakse uude infrastruktuuri. Selliste 
muutuste tõttu võivad turvariskid suureneda või väheneda, avalduda uued riskid või 
suudetakse kõrvaldada mõned olemasolevad riskid. Ainult äriprotsesside modelleerimisele 
tugineva riskianalüüsi puhul, kus tuvastatakse ettevõtte varade väärtus, puudub IT-
infrastruktuuri ja äriprotsesside omavahelise seose esindamine. Seega võib riskianalüüsis 
teatud infosüsteemi (IS) varasid hoopis eirata. Kahe infrastruktuuri turvariskide 
analüüsimisel tuleb arvestada ettevõtte arhitektuurilisi erinevusi, sest identifitseerimata IS 
varad võivad olla haavatavad ja kujutada ohtu käsitletavale organisatsioonile.  
Käesolevas töös tuvastatakse arhitektuuri modelleerimise kaudu varad, mis on vajalikud 
riskianalüüsi tegemiseks. Koostatud mudelid näitavad erinevusi, mis on seotud IS varadega 
organisatsiooni sisemise infrastruktuuri ja pilves vahel. Organisatsiooni arhitektuurist 
tulenevate IS varadega seotud turvariskide kindlaksmääramisel kasutatakse STRIDE 
taksonoomia põhist ohu modelleerimist. 
Selles uurimistöös esitletakse protseduuri, mis aitab organisatsioonidel tuvastada kahe 
infrastruktuuri IS varade muutusi ja mõista turvariskide erinevusi. Käesolevas uurimistöös 
kasutatud arhitektuuri modelleerimine illustreerib IS varade erinevusi ja näitab, kuidas 
äriprotsesse saab kaardistada tehnoloogia komponentidega. Seejärel võimaldab ohu 
modelleerimine struktuurselt määrata süsteemi ohtusid. Vastavad turvariskid 
kategoriseeritakse põhinedes uue infrastruktuuri olemasolule. Riskidega seotud muutused 
toovad esile ettevõtte sisemise infrastruktuuri ja pilve infrastruktuuri vahe. Selline 
lähenemisviis on kinnitatud ekspertide poolt. Käesolev uurimistöö põhineb 
juhtumiuuringul, mis käsitleb Põhja-Euroopas kasutatavat maksekanali süsteemi. 
 
Võtmesõnad:  
Riskianalüüs, ArchiMate, ISSRM, ettevõtlusarhitektuur, turvariskide juhtimine, 
pilvinfrastruktuur, Ohu modelleerimine, Maksevõrgu süsteem, BPMN 
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1 Introduction 
Cloud has become a choice, than a trend of top-level decision makers for new and existing 
IT infrastructures.  Migrating in-house infrastructure to cloud infrastructure have advantages 
such as the use of high-end latest technologies, flexibility, management facilities and be 
competitive in the dynamic world [1]. With the evolvement of cloud technology, security 
has become a cloud challenge [2]. The possibilities of the third parties gaining unauthorised 
access to confidential resources, account hijacking, denial of service and malicious insider 
attacks are risks on cloud environments.  But despite these fears, there is still a hype around 
cloud computing. According to Gartner predictions [3], 80% of in-house enterprise data 
centres will close down by 2025 because of the cloud. The fourteenth annual worldwide 
infrastructure security report by Netscout [4], shows that 49% of enterprise applications are 
already in the cloud. 
Cloud Infrastructure related security risks can be different from an in-house data centre be-
cause of the cloud enterprise architectures. Therefore, a risk analysis (RA) conducted to a 
business process in an in-house infrastructure will not apply to the cloud even though the 
business process remains constant.  These changes to system assets pose threats and there-
fore security risks can either remain, eliminate or initiate when a cloud migration happens.  
Information system asset identification based only on business process modelling fails to 
capture the enterprise architectural changes of a system before and after migration. Assets 
need to be identified before conducting a RA in any given context. Information system as-
sets are the assets that support business assets and needs to be protected from threats [5]. In 
organisations, a non-technical person conducts the business process analysis.  Therefore, the 
business process focused analysis lacks the reflection of all the information system assets 
which support the business assets. Furthermore, the mapping between the business process 
and corresponding infrastructure are absent and isolated. 
This thesis is focused on proposing a procedure to capture and compare security risk differ-
ences due to infrastructure change that happens when a payment gateway system is mi-
grated. The study provides a model-driven approach which can identify the changes to sys-
tem assets when infrastructure changes and the interdependencies to business processes. 
Enterprise architecture modelling is used to identify the architectural differences between 
in-house and cloud infrastructure.  The approach reflects the interrelationships and interde-
pendencies of business and system assets which helps to find what assets will have an impact 
due to a security risk. Information Systems Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is used as 
the RA method to identify the security risks of in-house and cloud infrastructure [5].  The 
differences of the security risks identified in the study are considered as the security risk gap 
in the work. This thesis is a case study based on a payment gateway system.  The organisa-
tion of the payment gateway system requires to know what security risks will change due to 
cloud migration. Unidentified information system assets pose threats to the organisation and 
make security risk analysis incomplete. The business process in the study will remain con-
stant, and therefore the changes to the infrastructure need to be focused on eliciting infor-
mation system assets from in-house and cloud architecture.     
Payment gateway system in in-house infrastructure is hosted in a non-virtualized environ-
ment while the cloud model is based on virtualization technology.  Due to privacy issues 
disclosing the payment gateway name is prohibited.  Therefore going forward payment gate-
way name is referred to as “PayGate”.  
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The main research question of the study is, 
What procedure can be used to find differences of security risks in the in-house in-
frastructure and cloud infrastructure? 
This main research question has three sub-research questions, 
RQ 1: What are the architectural differences between in-house infrastructure and cloud in-
frastructure? 
RQ 2: What are the business assets and supporting information system assets? 
RQ 3: What security risks change when a payment gateway system migrates from in in-
house to cloud infrastructures?  
This thesis will contribute to the organisations planning to migrate their payment gateways 
to cloud infrastructure by the STRIDE-based security risk gap analysis.  The procedure il-
lustrates how to capture information system assets using enterprise architecture.  The work 
extracts a business asset from the payment transaction process and present the interrelation-
ship to information systems using ArchiMate.  Afterwards, threat modelling based on the 
STRIDE is performed to find out threats in in-house and cloud infrastructure. The following 
are identified after threat analysis; 
1. The security risks in in-house architecture.  
2. The security risks in cloud architecture. 
3. The security risks differences in in-house architecture and cloud architecture. 
The findings presented in the work is validated by experts in the company to find the cor-
rectness of the models and usefulness of the approach to do a comparison in the enterprise.  
The external opinion is taken to find the usefulness of such an approach in the industry.  
This study consists of 7 chapters including the introduction and conclusion.  Chapter 1 pre-
sents the introduction to the problem, motivation of the research and scope of the study.  
Reports were analysed to find out the statistics and past trends to prove the importance.  
Chapter 2 consists of the methods and modelling languages used in the study providing 
previous related work and presenting justification for the method chosen.  Chapter 3 gives 
an introduction of payment gateway types and an overview of the infrastructures used in the 
study.  Also, it presents the enterprise architecture of in-house and cloud infrastructure to 
identify the context and the relationship of business assets and supporting assets using En-
terprise Architecture (EA) modelling.  Chapter 4 focuses on eliciting assets and presenting 
security objectives of business assets.  Chapter 5 concentrates on finding threats to infor-
mation system assets in in-house infrastructure and cloud infrastructure using the STRIDE 
threat modelling method. Furthermore, how risks will differentiate based on infrastructure 
migration will be discussed.  Chapter 6 evaluate the correctness and the usefulness of the 
approach used to find the security risk gap between infrastructures based on the expert’s 
ideas.  Chapter 7 concludes the research and provides limitations of the study.  Suggestion 
for future work is presented as a continuation of the work.   
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2 Literature Review and Background  
This chapter provides the theoretical background of security risk management methods, 
standards, notations, threat modelling techniques and previous research work that was con-
ducted.  Furthermore, this chapter explains what approaches are used to compare security 
risks that will diverse due to the cloud infrastructural migration by using a payment gateway 
as a case study. 
2.1 Security Risk Management Standards 
Security risk management standards have been implemented as a guideline to manage secu-
rity risks in information systems.  There are various number of standards that have been 
newly created and merged from existing standards.  Since this research is based on conduct-
ing a risk analysis for a payment gateway in Germany,  IT-Grundschutz, PCI DSS and 
company-specific requirements are discussed apart from the industry leading standards such as 
ISO/IEC 27xx and NIST as seen in figure 1.  
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the US has published several 
standards related to security risk management and assessment in information technology 
systems.  NIST special publication 800-30 is a guide for conducting a risk analysis which 
explains from assignment preparation to assessment maintenance as well as how the risk 
assessment and risk management of different organisations will correlate to each other [6].  
NIST SP 800-39 is a publication which represents organisation, business process and system 
level aspects when managing information security risk and it supports the steps described 
in the risk management framework. In addition, NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-37 also 
describe the risk management process and privacy related to cloud [7]. 
According to the PCI security standards council, Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) is a worldwide standard for any entity that store, process and transmit 
cardholder data [8]. The PCI DSS standard indicates and address technical and operational 
aspects. Payment gateway system which is the study based on needs to be PCI compliant 
because it manages credit card details. The standard consists of twelve requirements, and it 
is essential to have a continuous assessment for maintenance. Inadequacy to fulfil the re-
quirement can lead to monetary losses and sensitive data breaches leaving the organisation 
a bad reputation.  
The ISO/IEC 2700x family consists of several standards related to information security 
management systems (ISMS) [9].  The ISO/IEC 27005 standard is specifically designed to 
assist information security risk management approaches, and it is aligned with the basic 
concepts defined in ISO/IEC 27001 [10]. The company of the payment gateway system in 
the case study is maintaining ISO/IEC 27005: 2011 standard.  
IT-Grundschutz is a standard developed in Germany which provides a best practice ap-
proach compliant with ISO 27001 standards to advance information security management 
system (ISMS).  IT-Grundschutz has evolved from ISO27001 because of its technical adap-
tion while ISO standards are adjusted with business processes [11].  ISO 27005 security 
standard has a systematic approach to the development and maintenance of information se-
curity risk management process.  The third version, the ISO/IEC 27005: 2018 provides a 
framework to manage cybersecurity risk effectively [12].  The security standard has three 
main phases in its risk management process: risk identification, risk estimation and risk 
evaluation [10].   
The security standard that an organisation wants to maintain depends on the necessity and 
requirement of the organisation.  The organisation that the payment gateway process will be 
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taken into consideration is licenced to be ISO27005 certified.  Therefore when selecting the 
security risk management method the compatibility towards ISO27005 is considered.  
 
Figure 1: Security Risk Management Standards [11] [8] [7] [10] 
2.2 Security Risk Management Methods 
At present, there are numerous methods to conduct security risk management, and it is pre-
posterous to find out the best as every method is unique and has pros and cons.  A compar-
ison of CORAS [13], MEHARI [5], OCTAVE [18] and ISSRM [5] methods are presented 
to identify what suits most to this particular thesis.   
CORAS is one of the first security risk methods to have a model-driven risk analysis ap-
proach [13].  CORAS is aligned with ISO 31000 and has a language and a method which 
contains a practical and systematic guide.  This method mainly consists of 8 steps, “Initial 
preparations for the analysis, customer presentation of the target, refining the target de-
scription using asset diagrams, approval of the target description, risk identification using 
threat diagrams, risk evaluation using risk diagrams and risk treatment using treatment 
diagrams” as indicated in [14].  It has a graphical language for modelling risks and threats.  
The approach is focused towards the protection of current assets [15] but direct, indirect and 
human assets will be considered as well during the target identification [16].  
Method for Harmonized Analysis of Risk (MEHARI) is a risk management and risk assess-
ment method which was developed more than two decades ago.  MEHARI is a flexible 
method when defining the context establishments as it could be either apply to the entire 
organisation or narrow down to a business activity.  Organisations can use MEHARI for 
auditing if the particular context is compliant with the ISMS process and also the design 
itself supports ISO/IEC 27005.  Services, information data and compliance to regulations 
are types of assets considered in asset classification of the risk identification phase apart 
from stake analysis [5] [17].   
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) is a self-
directed risk-based strategic assessment intending to capture the current state of security 
practice in the organisation.  The method is driven by operational risks and security practices 
aspects.  It checks on strategic issues, focus on security practices and evaluate the organisa-
tion.  Three phase approach of OCTAVE identifies what is important to the organisation 
with current mitigation techniques, infrastructure level examination to identify vulnerabili-
ties and identify risks to the critical assets.  Small/medium organisations and large organi-
sations can use OCTAVE as it has two variants named OCTAVE -S and OCTAVE-Allegro 
which is compatible with large to small scale organisation [18].  OCTAVE method takes 
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consideration of employee participation during the risk management process.  This approach 
uses critical assets to identify and prioritise areas for improvement.  However, OCTAVE 
has organisational and technical differences which do not streamline with ISO27005 stand-
ards such as the dependency on workshops, people and the phases in the risk management 
process as per [19]. Additionally it does not reflect the relationships of different risks [20].  
Information system security risk management (ISSRM) consists of a domain model which 
has been developed by combining security risk management standards, security risk man-
agement and a survey of security-related standards [5].  ISSRM is aligned with ISO 2700k 
standards as well as it considers system and business assets when conducting security risk 
management.  ISSRM method is flexible as it does not have a dedicated tool or a modelling 
language in-built.  
Comparing the risk management methods as shown in Table 1 illustrates what method is 
most suitable to compare security risks in in-house and cloud infrastructure. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Risk Management Methods 
Name Support 
ISO/IEC 
27005? 
Threat Mod-
elling In-
cluded? 
Consider In-
frastructure 
Components? 
Tool 
Included? 
Modelling 
Language in-
dependent? 
CORAS NO YES YES YES NO 
MEHARI YES NO YES YES NO 
OCTAVE NO YES YES YES NO 
ISSRM YES YES YES NO YES 
 
ISO 27005 does not have a particular method for risk management and the organisations are 
free to choose their own method which supports ISO 27005 in order to be compliant with 
the standard.  CORAS and OCTAVE approaches have similarities, but both do not support 
ISO 27005 standards.  One of the main facts to consider in choosing the RM approach is 
whether it considers business assets and supporting assets. OCTAVE consider both 
organisational and technical assets, but the main focus is driven towards critical assets.  
Therefore both approaches are eliminated as a suitable RM method.  MEHARI is aligned 
with ISO standards, but it has an excel-based tool.  Since the thesis is about finding the 
security risk gap of different infrastructures, a visualised diagram and the flexibility of 
choosing a modelling language is considered as a benefit.  Therefore, ISSRM is chosen as 
the preferred RM method to conduct the risk analysis.  
2.3 ISSRM and Domain Model 
Asset identification is the first step to be followed in majority of risk analysis methods. 
However asset identification can have limitations based on the definition of RM method.  
ISO 27005 define asset as anything that has a value to the organisation therefore supporting 
assets are considered.  Asset identification and classification is important to develop a secure 
system and mitigate security risks.  As per figure 2, the first step of ISSRM process is to 
identify the context and assets.  Afterwards, the security objective of business asset needs 
to be identified based on confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA) triad.  Risk analysis 
and assessment are done to identify what could harm assets and threaten security objectives.  
First three steps will be repeated until a satisfactory assignment is made before risk treatment 
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as it is decisive to identify the risks thoroughly in order to treat security risks.  Figure 2 
shows how ISSRM aligns with ISO27005 framework proving the suitability to conduct the 
RA for this research work. According to the ISO 27005 completing risk identification and 
estimation is considered as risk analysis and evaluating the risks makes the risk assessment 
complete. Security objective determination can be seen in ISSRM as a separate step addi-
tionally to the steps that are presented in ISO 27005 framework. 
 
      
Figure 2: ISO27005 Framework [21] in left and ISSRM [5] in the right side 
 
ISSRM has a domain model which has three concepts related to assets, risks and risk treat-
ment as shown in figure 3 [5]. The following paragraphs which explain ISSRM concepts 
are based on [5]. 
In Asset related concept, an asset is considered as anything useful to the organisation in 
achieving objectives. Assets are divided as business and information system assets in 
ISSRM. Security objectives will be defined according to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the business asset using value metrics while information assets are support-
ing asset to the business.  If any information, process, capability or skill is required to the 
business, it can be categorised as a business asset.  Infrastructure, software along with peo-
ple engaged in the system is considered as an IS asset.   
Risk-related concepts illustrate how one or more assets in an organisation could have an 
adverse consequence of the risk due to a combination of threats executed by a threat agent 
on one or more vulnerabilities in an information system.  A potential negative consequence 
can affect both business assets and information assets directly or indirectly as data leakage 
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by a threat agent could have an impact on the confidentiality of customer information on a 
system.  Risk level metric is used to assess the risk, and it depends on impact level and 
potentiality of the event.  
The third concept of ISSRM domain model, “Risk treatment related” describes about treat-
ing the identified security risks. The decision can either be a risk avoidance, risk reduction, 
risk transfer or risk retention and this decision will be taken based on security requirements 
of an organisation.  
 
  
Figure 3: ISSRM Domain Model [5] 
 
2.4 Modelling Languages 
Modelling a system helps organisations to self-evaluate the requirements and completeness 
of the complex system while having a clear understanding about problems that was obscure 
during the initial stages. Furthermore, it supports to contrast the requirements and visualize 
the relationships of particular entities in various layers such as business, information tech-
nology layer [5]. 
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), is a modelling language for business pro-
cesses which has a set of rules defined for linking objects with different meanings.  BPMN 
itself is not built for security risk modelling. However, research [22] shows that BPMN can 
be compatible with ISSRM domain model to identify the context and assets in security risk 
management. This thesis is about comparing the security risk changes that can occur based 
on a migration. The business process diagram based on BPMN will only have a limited 
number of IS asset as the objective of BPMN is to model the business flow. Therefore a 
visualisation of business process mapped with underlying infrastructure is essential to iden-
tify the IS assets and the relationship with business processes to conduct the risk analysis. 
The Enterprise architecture (EA), a concept which demonstrates the IT infrastructure and its 
alignment to business [23]. TOGAF is an EA framework for developing enterprise architec-
tures [14]. In paper  [24], authors have described the conceptual alignment of TOGAF and 
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ISSRM Domain model. However, TOGAF is an independent framework, which is not ap-
pended to any enterprise architecture modelling language [14].  But ArchiMate is an EA 
modelling language which can visualise different domains, and it is well aligned with the 
TOGAF framework [15].  As shown in figure 4, ArchiMate 2.1 has a three-layer represen-
tation which consists of business layer, application layer and technology layer. The three 
layer view of ArchiMate 2.1 is used to show the mapping of business to IT layer through 
the application layer.  
Figure 4 presents three aspects that can be modelled with ArchiMate. Active structure pre-
sents the components of the layer and behaviours aspect present the services that each layer 
offers. The objects such as business objects, technology artifacts and data objects in appli-
cation are represented using the active structure. The capability of modelling business and 
technology of ArchiMate is used in the study to identify the architectural differences be-
tween in-house and cloud and to conduct the threat modelling to the IS assets. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ArchiMate Core Framework, adapted from [25]  
 
There is a limited number of modelling languages available for infrastructural modelling 
such as CySeMol [26], UML Class diagrams and SecuriLang.  The software systems avail-
able for CySeMol is outdated, and SecuriLang is built by improving CySeMol language 
[27]. SecuriCAD tool developed by Foreseeti [23] uses SecuriLang infrastructure modelling 
language and can be used to illustrate the low-level view of infrastructure components and 
the relationships of the entities [28]. However SecuriCAD tool has development bugs and 
some were reported during the research. In conclusion, during the research, only BPMN and 
ArchiMate modelling is used. 
 
2.5 Threat Modelling  
Information systems interact with other systems and can be operated in multiple infrastruc-
tures by different user groups. All the IS assets does not hold same level of importance as 
system requirements and goals can be different. Treating all the system assets equally cannot 
be considered as a good approach when it comes to security risk management. Processes 
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that holds critical information needs to have more attention. Thus, a company should prior-
itise assets based on the company requirements. Security engineering focus on reducing 
unauthorized harm, which is intended against an asset.  Predominantly, the attention towards 
security and risks have not been taken into consideration during early stages of system de-
velopment [22].   
As per [5] risk, is defined as a “Combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities 
leading to a negative impact on two or more assets by harming them”.  Therefore identifying 
the possible threats to assets are a necessity.  A survey  [29] was conducted regarding dif-
ferent threat modelling approaches where some are dedicated to RM methods while some 
are not attached to a specific RM method.  Attack trees, CORAS, STRIDE are some of the 
threat modelling methods that have been examined in the survey.   
STRIDE threat modelling methodology was invented by L.  Kohnfelder and P.  Garg [30] 
and  has been in the industry since 1999.  A previous study [31] about Risk management in 
E-commerce system has applied STRIDE as a threat modeller to identify threats while fol-
lowing the ISSRM and it has shown the compatibility of using STRIDE along with ISSRM. 
Therefore, threat identification in this study will be based on STRIDE. STRIDE can be used 
to focus on processors, data and entities.  STRIDE taxonomy gives an approach to identify 
threats in the systems by categorizing it into six threat types. Table 2 shows the STRIDE 
categories and their descriptions.  
 
Table 2: STRIDE Threat Categories [30] 
Threat category Security property 
violation 
Description  
Spoofing Authentication Impersonating something or someone that 
is not intended to be 
Tampering Integrity Modifying something in infrastructure or 
the process 
Repudiation Non-repudiation Claiming that someone or something is 
not responsible for an action that has hap-
pened.  
Information dis-
closure 
Confidentiality Exposing information to parties not au-
thorized 
Denial of service Availability Make services unavailable by deny, de-
grade or utilizing the resources intending 
to make the service unavailable 
Elevation of 
privilege 
Authorization Doing a particular thing that a party is not 
intended to do 
 
2.6 Related Work 
Related work helps to identify the research gap and to continue with the finding that was 
presented earlier. Thus, this section will focus on enterprise architecture, threat modelling 
in infrastructures and risk management related work which focuses on business processes. 
The research [32] proposes a novel approach for risk assessment through the use of EA.  
The objective of the work is to bridge the gap between the technical and business views of 
systematic security risk assessment.  Through the proposed approach, the author has tried 
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to reduce the complexity of the business process in supporting assets by illustrating an ab-
straction that shows the interdependencies of each layer. This study describes the alignment 
of EA from asset identification to risk treatment.  However, the research work has not been 
implemented in a case study. 
Cloud computing threat analysis is written in several papers including those that conduct 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. In paper [33], the authors present threat modelling for 
cloud infrastructure.  The intention of the research is to provide potential threats and 
mitigation techniques for the cloud infrastructure because there has not been much research 
conducted on infrastructural threat modelling even though cloud computing is trending.  The 
study focuses on several threat modelling and threat measuring techniques applied to a real 
world cloud infrastructure. Attack trees, attack graphs, and attack surface analysis, are the 
threat modelling methods used by the authors. This paper helps the cloud providers to 
identify and harden the security of the cloud.  However, business layer modelling and the 
interdependencies of business and infrastructure is not presented in this study. In study [34] 
STRIDE based threat identification on cloud was conducted.  Authors motivation towards 
writing this paper is to present threats and risks based on cloud.  But author is not 
considering the impact on assets. Furthermore, this paper is based on generalized threats in 
the cloud environment.  
Research work [35] “ Security Risk Management in the Aviation Turnaround Sector ’ is a 
research which used ISSRM to analyze the cross-organisational collaborations.  Author has 
modelled the business layer and followed the ISSRM domain model, but visibility of 
infrastructure associated with the business layer cannot be seen in this work. The author has 
mentioned analyzing security threats in cloud-supported enterprise collaboration as a future 
work. The doctoral thesis [36]  has provided a method for risk analysis of the virtualized 
systems.  The author has illustrated how useful it is to do the risk assessment not only to the 
infrastructure but the process flow as well.  One of the scientific novelty of the thesis is the 
introduction of a numeric procedure combining exploit scores and its probabilities.  The in-
depth analysis of the threats in virtualization systems in multiple perspectives had added 
value in the evaluation phase.  Cloud computing is one of the main forms of virtualization 
and it is favourable to have a  proven risk assessment methodology aligned with a thread 
modelling technique which is flexible to compare the cloud as well as the on-premises in-
frastructure for a client who needs to compare how risk could change in virtualized envi-
ronments and in-house infrastructures.  Detailed description of relationship representation 
of the components and tasks of different layers were not highlighted.  
The author of the paper [37] has used ArchiMate for enterprise architecture modelling to 
manage security risks. The Author’s goal was to present the alignment of EA to SRM. The 
author has only shown high-level mapping, but low-level modelling of each layer and the 
relationship between business assets and its relating information assets has not been the 
focusing point. Previous research work [14] describe the complexity of information security 
RM and the need for integrating EA modelling with ISSRM.  The objective of the paper is 
to take the ISSRM domain model to be extended as a framework which consists of a method, 
language and a tool.  TOGAF was used as the EA framework, and the alignment of ISSRM 
along with TOGAF is described clearly by highlighting the relationships of both concepts.  
The focus was on integrating the two models, and this was not applied to a real-world sce-
nario.  The authors have not presented the usability of EA and ISSRM for risk assessment.  
The integration of asset related concepts are used in this study. Research work [38] shows 
the modelling of security concepts and its corresponding relationships with Enterprise ar-
chitecture.  The compatibility of ArchiMate with EA frameworks have also been described.  
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The study does not present a risk management approach considered in the work even though 
the design models related to risks concepts are properly presented.  
The cloud infrastructure, risk analysis and threat modelling related research has been con-
ducted in the past.  
But during the literature review, it revealed that EA based risk analysis approach to compare 
infrastructures were lacking. Therefore the study will focus on how EA based security risk 
analysis can be used to compare security risk changes between different infrastructures. 
Also this study is based on a real world implementation. 
2.7 Summary 
Chapter two presents the theoretical background of security risk management methodolo-
gies and standards.  A comparison was made to identify the most suitable risk management 
methodology, and ISSRM was chosen due to its systematic approach and the categorisation 
of different concepts in the domain model.  This thesis will illustrate how infrastructural 
change would affect the risk analysis process.  Since ISSRM is modelling language inde-
pendent, BPMN was chosen to model the business process. ArchiMate will be used for en-
terprise architecture modelling and the relationship between the layers will be presented via 
ArchiMate EA model. STRIDE threat modelling methodology is used for threat analysis of 
the traditional in-house infrastructure and the cloud infrastructure.  Table 3 summarises the 
chosen approaches to perform a comparison of security risk in the in-house infrastructure 
and a cloud infrastructure.  
 
Table 3: State of Art Abstract 
Category Name of chosen method /language 
/type /diagram 
Risk management method ISSRM 
Type of assets Business and IS assets 
Types of infrastructures  In-house infrastructure and cloud in-
frastructure 
Business process modelling lan-
guage 
BPMN 
Business asset and infrastructure 
mapping framework 
TOGAF 
Business asset and infrastructure 
mapping language 
ArchiMate using Archi software 
Threat modelling method STRIDE 
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3 Context of the Study 
Chapter 3 focuses on providing answers to RQ 1.  RQ 1 is supported by three sub-questions 
and the chapter describes the architectural differences between in-house infrastructure and 
cloud infrastructure. 
RQ 1: What are the architectural differences between in-house infrastructure and 
cloud infrastructure? 
RQ 1. 1: What is the in-house infrastructure of payment gateway system? 
RQ 1. 2: What is the cloud infrastructure of payment gateway system? 
RQ 1. 3: What can be used to model in-house and cloud infrastructure? 
3.1 Payment Gateway System 
Information and communication technology (ICT) has established its roots in diversified 
fields and e-commerce has been one of the instances.  E-commerce has opened the gates for 
merchants and buyers by providing the opportunity to buy and sell without any geographical 
boundaries. When the number of e-commerce appliances increased, an application was built 
to process payments by acting as an intermediator for financial institutes and merchants. 
The security risk analysis of the research is based on this intermediator which is the payment 
gateway system. A system is a group of components interacts and interconnect for a com-
mon goal [5].  Table 4 presents examples of system components in payment gateway system.    
Table 4: Payment Gateway System 
System Components Case Study Examples 
Product/ Components 
Database, PayGate UI, Payment 
processing system 
Infrastructure 
Web application servers, Load balancers, 
Firewalls, Network and Devices 
Application PayGate app  and Fraud app 
Information Technology Staff 
Application support, DB support, 
Developer 
Users - Internal Webshop merchant 
Users - External Webshop customer 
Environment Northern Europe  
 
The study is based on the payment gateway system PayGate. PayGate provides service to 
more than 21 EU countries and 110 merchants are using the multi-channel payment solution.  
Availability of payment gateway process is important for an uninterrupted service to the 
customers apart from protecting confidentiality and integrity of information and processes.  
Payment gateways are categorised based on the integration method it uses to connect with 
a merchant.  Hosted and self-hosted are the integration methods of payment gateways [39].  
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3.1.1 Hosted Payment Gateway 
Hosted payment gateway redirect a customer to the payment service providers system to 
enter payment details during the checkout process.  Payment details are not captured by the 
webshop because of this redirection.  Placing an iframe of the payment gateway inside the 
merchant store is alternation for redirection to a payment service provider (PSP) page during 
the checkout.  Since the customer is providing credit card information directly to the pay-
ment gateway system, the e-commerce site does not require to be PCI compliant. Examples: 
PayPal, 2Checkput and Payza.  
3.1.2 Self-hosted Payment Gateway 
In self-hosted payment gateways, the webshop collects customer payment details during the 
checkout process. The API integration is used to send the captured payment detail request 
to the payment gateway by the webshop.  Therefore the customer will not enter the payment 
details directly in payment gateway.  
3.2 Technical Infrastructure  
Technical infrastructure exist based on a combination of components such as software, net-
work, hardware and people. The organisation of the PayGate is planning to move the pay-
ment gateway system into the cloud infrastructure.  Therefore detail analysis of current in-
frastructure is conducted to find the changes to architecture before the cloud migration.  
3.2.1 Infrastructure of In-house Payment Gateway 
The case study of PayGate infrastructure is based on the same premises as the organisation.  
The infrastructure is non-virtualised and consists of routers, web application firewall, hard-
ware security module, data stores and load balancer.  Cardholder data environment has been 
separated from order management, fraud checking and merchant support systems.  The in-
frastructure that will be considered in this thesis consists of physical and logical separations, 
hosted in the premises of the business.  Employees of the payment gateway organisation are 
conducting the maintenance and management of servers. The current infrastructure is hold-
ing credit card information of more than hundred merchant services and the payment gate-
way has been in the market for around five years.   
Infrastructure details of PayGate system was gathered by interviewing domain experts. 
Furthermore, network maps, hardware details web application firewall (WAF) and past 
vulnerability reports were analysed. The in-house infrastructure web application firewall is 
a software-based firewall configured with Apache ModSecurity. Hardware security module 
in the diagram is a physical device used for cryptoprocessing [40]. This module is connected 
to the datastore which has payment details stored. In the payment gateway system, internal 
applications are developed by PayGate employees and third part application refer to 
applications such as Fraud app which is used in the environment to check the customer’s 
legitimacy. The fraud rules are managed by PayGate.There are two types of firewalls in the 
environment and one category is software based and one category is hardware based. Since 
this is a PCI environment, every quarter a vulnerability scan is conducted. However, there 
isn’t an automated mechanism to authorize access of the people to the Server room and this 
access is controlled by a security guard. Video surveillance is available as part of PCI 
requirement and it is yet a intrusion detection system. 
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3.2.2 Cloud Infrastructure  
The adoption and use of cloud computing technology has risen greatly since the late 2000s, 
with much encouragement from companies such as Google, Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, and 
Rack space as seen in their cloud solutions [41].  Businesses migrate to cloud datacentres 
do not need to acquire and maintain large IT technologies on-site but instead, access these 
IT resources, from a remote location which is often managed by cloud service provider.  
Cloud is categorised to three main models such as infrastructure as a service (IaaS), software 
as a service (SaaS) and platform as a service (PaaS).  
In IaaS, the service provider will give access to computing resources in the virtual environ-
ment allowing the customer to access computing resources from a hardware resource pool.  
These resources can be distributed to provide reliability and to avoid single point of failures.  
The customer is responsible for the installation of required software, applications and inter-
nal firewall separations [42].  Most of the cloud solutions are based on type 1 hypervisors 
and virtual machines are built on these hypervisors.  Resources such as CPU, memory and 
network is shared among different customers.  Policies and procedures towards maintaining 
hardware is important and clear segregation of responsibilities will avoid threats to systems.  
Example: Threat due to an unpatched hypervisor could make all the virtual machines in the 
host to pose a security risk.  
In PaaS, customers get the opportunity to develop, deploy and manage the applications by 
themselves on a pre-installed platform or with necessary tools.  Since the platform is de-
pendent on the service-oriented architecture, the issues related to this architecture such as 
DOS, XML attacks, injection will be automatically inherited.  
In SaaS, the customer will get inbuilt applications hosted in infrastructure of service pro-
vider.  This service is available via the internet and hosted on the platform.  The main secu-
rity countermeasures that service providers must be responsible is that they should keep the 
applications patched accordingly and web configurations should be correctly configured. 
One key difference between IaaS, PaaS and SaaS is the level of control that the customer 
has in the cloud stack as opposed to the level of control for cloud provider.   
Resource sharing and boundaries of deployment will be based on the cloud deployment 
model.  Public cloud is a cost-effective solution compared to private, community and hybrid 
deployment models.  Reports shows enterprise migration to cloud will grow within next two 
years [3].  Therefore, public deployment model is considered in this study.  
According to NIST SP 800-145 [58], “The cloud customer does not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and 
deployed applications; and possibly limited control of select networking components (e. g. 
, host firewalls)”.  Figure 6 shows what types of systems needs to be taken care by the cloud 
service provider in terms of security.  Furthermore, dynamic nature of the IaaS environment 
(e. g. , with creating, removing and migrating VMs), present more challenges in the defence 
against cyber-attacks to the system.  
Cloud concept and its use in the industry is not new, but responsibilities needs to be clearly 
identified by the cloud service provider and customer, to identify who needs to protect a IS 
system from a threat.  However, the responsibilities can be dependent on the deployment 
model or architectural model [43].  Figure 5 shows the abstract of the shared responsibilities 
of the customer and cloud provider.   
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Figure 5: Shared Responsibilities of Cloud Customer and Cloud Provider [44] 
3.3 Enterprise Architecture of the Payment Gateway System 
Architecture of organisations are complex due to the distribute nature and integration of 
modern technologies.  Architecture is basically a structure with a clear perception which 
presents the interdependencies and interrelationships of business processes and infor-
mation systems [45].  Systematic modelling capability of EA helps to capture dynamic 
changes of infrastructure and dependencies.  Therefore, pre-migration and post-migration 
infrastructure of the payment gateway system is modelled using EA modelling language 
named ArchiMate 2. 1.  
As shown in figure 6, ArchiMate EA model contains three layers: Business Layer, 
Application Layer and Technology Layer. Business layer contains business services and 
business processes. Application is the intermediatory layer because it supports the 
businessess processes and services by providing software services and these services are 
hosted in the technology layer. Technology layer has the hardware, networking and facility 
components and it offers services needed to run applicaitons. In-house EA and cloud EA is 
modelled to find the changes of architectural components and the links between business 
process and the infrastructure. An assumption was made that the tasks of business process 
remained same while the infrastructure will be changed. In both, ISSRM and ISO 27005 
standard “people” are considered as an IS asset and it can be divided as internal parties and 
external parties.  
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Figure 6: EA Model Layers [38] 
3.3.1 In-house Enterprise Architecture of PayGate System 
Analysis of the cardholder data environment in PayGate helped to identify the main pro-
cesses and its sub processes.  According the requirements, and information gathered, three 
layers were modelled. Business layer gives the overview from business perspective and 
technology layer of figure 7 presents the infrastructural components of the in-house payment 
gateway system. The technology layer first level abstraction as seen in figure 7, was mod-
elled using the network map of the environment.  Interdependencies of business layer to 
technology layer was modelled after a thorough analysis.  Given below provides an example 
of how EA modelling will ease to find the underlying technology of a business process and 
hence to find out the corresponding IS assets. 
Example: Customer (user group) receive “Accept order payments”  (business service) 
from Payment transaction process (a process in business layer) and Payment gateway 
application and Order management applications are used to provide Process credit card 
data, PSP connection and “Process order information” application services to the Payment 
transaction process.  These applications are directly linked with technology layer services 
such as host payment gateway, generate logs, databases service and application hosting 
services.  The infrastructure that provides those services are support zone, Application 
server farm and Webshop.  Figure 7 diagrams illustrates the high level abstraction of in-
house EA of the payment gateway system. 
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Figure 7: ArchiMate Model of In-house Infrastructure 
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In figure 7, EA model of in-house presents five actors. The business layer consist of business 
services and business processes. There are four business processes in payment gateway 
system represented in the business layer. Those are, payment transaction process, recurring 
process, refund process and merchant support process. These four business processes does 
not access the same technology component or applications. The abstract present how these 
processes are connected to technology layer. There are four applications hosted in the 
application layer. Order management has its own application but mainly connected with the 
PayGate application.  Fraud app and merchant support applications are not developed by 
PayGate company, but has full control over the application configuration. Hardware, 
network and facilities are presented, but does not reflect all the components or relationships 
as this is a high level diagram. Infrastructure support engineer and security guard is only 
mapped with paymenet transaction process. These two actors needs to be linked with other 
processes as well. However the links were not presented to reduce over complexity of the 
diagram.Backup storage is interntanally not connected as it is stored seperately.  
 
3.3.2 Cloud Enterprise Architecture of PayGate System 
Cloud technology layer was modelled using the information gathered from popular cloud 
providers such as OpenVAS, Amazon and Rack space.  The cloud model presented in this 
work is generalized.  The environment of the cloud data centre is not dedicated and therefore 
cloud co-tenants might be residing in the same hypervisor even though there is a network 
separation.  Storage services and shared resource pool is accessed by all the co-tenants net-
worked to the storage.  Cloud maintenance users are considered out of scope due to the 
highly distributed nature of vendor supporting involved in cloud services.  Cloud has ad-
vanced functionalities and the technology in use are different. Example: Cloud data network. 
Major architectural difference between cloud and in-house infrastructure are, cloud has 
components related to virtualization. Switches, networks in the cloud are mostly logical 
separations. Cloud has shared resource pooling in order to facilitate the growing need of 
resources. Therefore storage access cannot be segregated from other con-tenants in public 
cloud. In the cloud architecture also the same business processes can be identified due to the 
assumption made in the scope of study.  
Among the business processes modelled in both infrastructures, payment transaction pro-
cessing will be taken into consideration. The expansion of payment transaction process will 
be discussed in chapter 4 to elicit the business assets. Figure 8 presents the abstraction of 
the cloud data centre and the integration with PayGate business processes.   
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Figure 8: ArchiMate Model of Cloud Infrastructure 
28 
 
3.4 Summary 
The chosen study will present a hosted payment gateway process where the webshop will 
not need to store credit card information and the payment gateway will handle the customer 
credit card information.  The chapter is about finding architectural differences of in-house 
and cloud infrastructure.  Firstly a thorough analysis of the in-house data centre was con-
ducted by interviewing people and analysing the documents related to the environment.  
Cloud model was created based on research models that are publicly available.  EA model-
ling is used in this chapter to visualize the differences from an abstract level to get an un-
derstanding of the differences before and after a migration to cloud infrastructure.  
The in-house is based on a non-virtualised environment and cloud infrastructure in EA is 
based on a virtualised environment. In cloud environment cloud service provider will have 
access to the environment while in-house security guard will not be presented in the cloud. 
The major technology level component change that can be seen is the virtualization based 
changes such as shared resource pool and cloud specific network configurations.  
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4 Asset Identification of Payment Gateway System 
Chapter 4 focuses on providing answers to RQ 2.  RQ 2 is supported by three sub questions 
and the chapter helps to elicit business assets and IS assets from in-house and cloud infra-
structure. 
RQ 2: What are the business assets and supporting information system assets? 
RQ 2. 1: What to use to identify and elicit assets in in-house and cloud infrastructure?  
RQ 2. 2: What are assets in-house datacenter and cloud infrastructure?  
RQ 2. 3: What are the security need of business assets? 
Asset identification of a given context needs proper analysis as it will present the organisa-
tional assets to be protected and helps to identify the security objective of each business 
assets.  Assets that will be considered in risk management is dependable on the method 
chosen as asset definition and asset capturing differs from one RM method to another.  Poor 
identification of assets and insufficient attention towards generalized risks can lead to po-
tential harm.  To have better visibility of the business assets worth protecting, a visualization 
of the business process is presented in this chapter.  The connectivity of information system 
with business assets is represented via ArchiMate through the application layer in Chapter 
03 as the first abstract level model.  Figure 9 presents how assets are elicited using modelling 
languages. In chapter 3, ArchiMate 1st level diagram is presented. In chapter 4, an expansion 
of Payment transaction process is made using BPMN. Order details in the figure 9 is to 
represent that only one asset will be chosen and modelled with associated system assets. 
 
Figure 9: Model based asset identificaiton 
4.1 Business Processes of Payment Gateway System 
Payment gateway process is the bridge between customer and financial institute which han-
dle transaction details on behalf of the merchant.  Merchant will send a request to the pay-
ment gateway company asking for the service to be integrated.  The case study is based on 
a hosted payment gateway which uses Widget API.   
Payment gateway system is a combination of multiple processes and failing to meet security 
requirements in one process can lead to critical harm in other processes due to the interde-
pendencies.  Figure 10 shows the value chain of payment transaction process derived from 
the enterprise architecture business layer.  Appendix 1 contains the BPMN diagram of Pay-
ment Transaction process.  
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Figure 10: Value Chain of Payment Transaction Process   
 
Payment transaction process has three sub processes:  
1. Order Checkout  
2. Fraud Verification 
3. Transaction acceptance 
 
Order checkout process starts when the customer proceeds to checkout. The webshop will 
request for available payment methods for a chosen shop from PayGate and it will send the 
response with a security token which is used to uniquely identify the transaction. Payment 
gateway iframe will be loaded afterwards this study is based on a hosted payment gateway.  
Customer will enter the payment details  and this details will be encrypted using AES 256 
and sent to the PayGate.  The webshop will not see the credit card details as  customer 
payment details will sent  to PayGate without transferring it to webshop. Payment details 
has customer credit card number, CVV and expiry details. If the payment details validation 
passes, webshop will send Order details to PayGate.  Order details contains customer name, 
customer DOB, customer email address, shipping address, customer address, order ID, order 
item, quantity and price.  Figure 11 presents the Order checkout process.  
When PayGate receive Order details from the webshop, it sends details to be checked against 
a fraud database.  The check is conducted by comparing email addresses, shipping addresses 
and past transaction records.  If the customer is identified as fraudulent, webshop will be 
informed.  Figure 12 presents the Fraud Verification process.  
PayGate will connect to the PSP layer if the request comes till process the payment task as 
seen in figure 13 PSP layer will send a response back to the PayGate about the status of the 
transaction based on the response it received from the bank.  If the payment has been de-
clined by the bank a notification will be sent to the customer and the order cancellation 
happens.  If the payment is successful, the webshop delivers the message to the customer 
and notify the shipping process which is out of scope in this study.  Figure 13 presents the 
Transaction acceptance process.  
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Figure 11: Order Checkout Process 
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Figure 12: Fraud Verification Process 
 
Figure 13: Transaction Acceptance Process 
4.2 Security Objectives of Business Assets 
According to ISSRM, determining the security objectives of the context and asset identified 
is listed as the second step of the ISSRM process.  Security objective can be generalized as 
the need of defining the level of assurance or protection of the information systems and the 
information from any kind of action which would lead to destruction, unapproved access, 
disclosing information, modifying, using systems and data or interrupt the service.  
Security Objectives are mainly categorised as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, 
however the level of each property needs to be maintained is decided by the criticality of 
the asset and the context of the business [46].  
Confidentiality: This refers to that restriction of disclosing information to parties that are 
unauthorized to access in order to protect the privacy of people and proprietary information.  
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 Example: A server in a PCI environment needs to have adequate protection of the 
data because it stores/transmit credit card information.  If an unauthorized party can 
view the credit card information, then it violated confidentiality of the information.  
Integrity: This is the property of ensuring that the assets are not altered or deleted by unau-
thorized party and it maintains the accuracy.  
 Example: A malicious actor changes the recurring information consent of a customer 
and a customer will not be charged the appropriate amount of money for the service 
subscription.  
Availability: Property which assure that authorized assets can be accessed without any in-
terruption in required time.  
 Example: An attacker utilize the resources of the payment gateway and make the 
payment widget unavailable to the users who wants to purchase an item from the 
webshop.  
A security risk can harm one or more security objectives of a business.  There are supporting 
security objectives to the CIA properties that are related to the users who use information or 
interacts with different business assets.  Authentication means the verification of who you 
are by using what you know, what you are or what you have [47].  Authorization determines 
what permission level a particular person intended to have once authorized.  Non-repudia-
tion means the assurance given on a particular activity cannot be rejected or denied or be 
accountable for the actions.   
Defining the level of security objectives on different environment can be contrast from one 
another.  Understanding the security objectives and evaluating the controls for protections 
can be somewhat difficult in cloud infrastructure, because the responsible party of security 
cannot be limited to service provider or either buyer/customer.  It can be defined as a hand-
shake where both parties equally contribute and should be cautious about the security as a 
breach from either side can lead to major disasters and violate the security properties.  Table 
5 shows the Business assets derived from the BPMN diagram with the security objective of 
each asset.  
 
Table 5: Businessness Assets and Security Objectives 
BPMN 
Reference Business Asset 
Primary Security Objec-
tives 
C I A 
A Security Token x x  
B Payment Token x x x 
D Credit Card Information x x x 
G Order details x x x 
H Transaction Token x x x 
Z Payment Methods  x x 
Y  Fraud Results  x x 
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4.3 System Assets of Payment Gateway System  
After eliciting the business assets and determining security objectives, one asset was chosen 
to further model and expand the technology layer. This expansion was modelled using Ar-
chiMate. Order details were chosen among the business assets elicited. Figure 14 and Figure 
15 contains an expansion of both infrastructures.  
 
Figure 14: Order Details Mapped to Architecture Components of In-house 
 
 
Figure 15: Order Details Mapped to Architecture Components of Cloud 
Figure 14 and figure 15 was modelled based on the first level archimate diagram presented 
in chapter 3. Order details were derived from the payment transaction process  and the 
technology layer was expanded based on the mapping on buisness to appplication and 
technology layer. Table 6 shows the system asset components of in-house architecture and 
cloud architecture that will be used on the risk analysis. This table is not a comparison of 
IS assets that could exist in in-house and cloud infrastrcure. Some of the assets presented 
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in in-house can also be presented in cloud. However the reason why it has been shown in 
the table is becasue of the premises it is based on. 
Table 6: System Assets of Infrastructures  
System Assets 
Components of In-house  
Architecture 
Components of Cloud  
Architecture 
External firewall Cloud service provider 
Security guard Shared resource pool 
Video surveillance CDN network 
Backup tapes 3rd party monitoring tool 
Infrastructure support engineer Shared backup storage 
DB03 (Server name) DB03 
Heating system Log server 
Log server  
4.4 Summary 
The objective of the chapter is to expand a selected business process from ArchiMate 
diagram in Chapter 03.  Payment transaction process was chosen to be modelled with 
BPMN.  In this chapter an assumption is made that the process flow of the business flow 
will remain same even the infrastructure changes. Security objectives were identified for the 
business assets derived from BPMN diagram.  To find out the IS assets of in-house and 
cloud infrastructure to the specific business asset, Archimate  second level modelling is 
used. 
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5 Risk Analysis of Payment Gateway System 
Chapter 5 is focuses on providing answers to RQ3.  RQ3 is supported by three sub questions 
and the chapter consists of security risk analysis and providing security risk scenarios of in-
house and cloud infrastructure.  
RQ 3: What security risks change when a payment gateway system migrates from 
in-house to cloud infrastructures? 
RQ 3. 1: What are security threats in in-house infrastructure and cloud infrastructure? 
RQ 3. 2: What are security risks in in-house infrastructure and cloud infrastructure? 
RQ 3. 3: What are the differences and similarities of security risks after migration? 
5.1 Global Payment-based Risk Overview 
According to 2017 reports by Statista shows that 1. 66 billion of people in the world are 
online buyers and it is expected to grow another half a billion by 2021.  Among the digital 
buyers 42% prefer to pay with credit cards [48].  These payments are handled by payment 
gateway systems.  Payment gateways store and transmit credit card details as well as per-
sonal information which are valuable to organizations and holds monitory value.  Payment 
domain is a target of threat agents because of the information that it handles.  
Payment Gateway or any other organisation that process cardholder data needs to be PCI 
DSS standard compliant.  PCI DSS is a standard and being compliant does not assure that 
security risks are treated.  For the first time in the history of online fraud for credit cards 
knock over the in-person figures by 2016 resulting in 58% for online card fraud and 42% 
in-person fraud [49].  There are strict guidelines for payment processing businesses regard-
ing the management and protection of customer sensitive data, but yet as per 2016 Verizon 
report, it shows 80% still fail to maintain the PCI DSS standard when processing payments 
[49].  Neiman Marcus [50] faced a breach in 2015 exposing 1. 1 million payment card details 
of customers despite the company being aligned to PCI DSS standards.   
University of Cambridge has conducted a cyber risks analysis [51] worldwide by providing 
case studies.  Denial of Service Attacks are yet a major concern in cyber security which has 
diverse from traditional approaches such as attacking the entire infrastructure but having 
focus to infrastructural components.  In 2017 AWS S3 storage bucket went offline globally 
impacting the “Availability” aspect which has approximately lost 150 million dollars due to 
the four hours of downtime is an example that reputed cloud providers cannot guarantee to 
meet security objectives of data [51].  “Global data risk report” [52] by Varonis shows that 
58% of organisations have not managed folder rights appropriately, which has resulted in 
100,000 of folders available to the public.  It is evident by now that technological advance-
ment cannot guarantee to increase the level of security in systems and risk mitigation can 
be challenging due to complexities of systems and unidentified risks.  
Table 7 presents payment related breaches happened in 2018 and how financial companies 
have been impacted due to attacks.  It concludes that cyber-attacks targeting the payment 
processing industry has increased.  
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Table 7: 2018 Payment Card Breaches [53] 
Company 
Name 
Company Do-
main 
Month Impact and Reason Potential Reason for 
breach 
British Air-
ways 
Airline September  Personal and Financial 
380000 customers 
Payment form script 
modification 
Dixons Car-
phone 
Electronics 
retailer 
July  Personal and Financial 
105000 customers 
No chip and Pin pro-
tection 
Ticketmaster 
UK 
Entertainment 
ticket seller 
June  40000 Personal and 
Financial 
Due to a malicious 
software  third-party 
application 
Rail Europe Train ticket 
distributor 
April  Personal and Financial 
(The entire system 
was compromised) 
Credit card-skimming 
malware in website 
One Plus Smart Phone 
manufacturer 
January  40000 c/c details com-
promised 
Malicious code in pay-
ment gateway 
 
5.2 Security Risk Analysis of Payment Gateway System 
Vulnerability is a weakness [5] in a IS asset and can exist in a software application, network, 
facility, hardware and people related to an organization.  Threat agents exploit the weak-
nesses in the system assets.  No organization can claim that the information systems are free 
from vulnerabilities because attackers are finding zero day vulnerabilities to exploit infor-
mation systems.  Therefore identifying vulnerabilities in enterprise is a continuous process.  
Therefore systems which handle payment data conduct vulnerability assessment each quar-
ter as a requirement of PCI [54].  
A threat agent can be anyone who uses an attack method to exploit a vulnerability in a IS 
system based.  Objectives of a threat agent vary according to the motivation, knowledge and 
expertise level.  Report [55] present that 90% of enterprises are vulnerable to attacks from 
insiders because of poor management in access privileges, complexities in technology and 
the capability to access sensitive data from various devices.  
In the study a categorization has been introduced based on how risks will change after a 
migration.  Figure 16 presents the Risk categorisation.  
 New Risks: A risk that will not exist in In-house but will be available in cloud after 
the migration.  
Example: Cloud Infrastructure have shared resource pools and a threat to these pools 
will not exist in in-house because the IS does not exist in in-house infrastructure.  
 Remaining Risks: A security risk that will exist in cloud and in-house infrastructure.  
The likelihood of the security risk can increase or decrease.  (Risk matrix is out of 
scope and therefore what risks will increase and what risks will decrease will not be 
evaluated.) 
Example: Application level injection attack will not eliminate when the infrastruc-
ture changes.  But the likelihood can change based on the defence on depth technol-
ogies used in cloud.  
 Eliminated Risks: Security risks that exist in in-house infrastructure, but with never 
exist in cloud infrastructure.  
Example: Physical attacks towards in-house infrastructure will not be applicable in 
cloud because in-house employees do not have access to cloud data centre and also 
data is distributed.   
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Figure 16: Risk Categorisation 
5.3 STRIDE-based Threat Event and Impact Analysis 
Due to the complex nature of the payment gateway, threat analysis will be conducted for IS 
assets that supports Order details business asset.  Order details sent by the merchant contains 
customer name, customer DOB, customer email address, shipping address, customer 
address, order ID, order item, quantity and price.   
Using STRIDE based asset-centric approach will be followed as ISSRM asset related con-
sider software as an asset and attacker view on infrastructure will be considered.  It is unwise 
to only think about the past attacks that have occurred and to check if those are potential 
risks in both infrastructures as there can be threats that have not yet been compromised by 
a threat agent.  Impact due to a security risk could result in harming both business assets and 
supporting assets (IS assets). STRIDE categorization has previously been used by compo-
nents end elements.  
Table 8 presents a threat scenarios to find different risks in each infrastructure.  Therefore 
objective is not to find the best risk scenario but give an insight of a practical example.  The 
IS assets that exist only in-house infrastructure is considered because a threat exploit a vul-
nerability in a IS asset and if the chosen IS is not presented in the cloud means the risk 
presented for in-house will never happen on cloud environment.  Therefore security risk 
matrix based calculations will not be needed.  This should be the same when finding threats 
to the cloud infrastructure IS assets that supports the Order details business asset.  
Three constraints were made when presenting the risk scenarios to identify unique risks.  
1. Unique components of each architecture is used to form the risk scenario.  
2. Business asset of the in-house and cloud-based infrastructure to a particular 
STRIDE category should be similar.  
3. The business object of all scenarios will remain the same.  
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Table 8: STRIDE-based Threat Event and Impact Analysis 
Threat 
Type 
In-house Infrastructure Cloud Infrastructure 
S
p
o
o
fi
n
g
 
(S
P
) 
IS Asset: Security guard, Server room 
Vulnerability: Improper authentication 
mechanism in Server room 
Threat Agent: An unauthorised em-
ployee,  
Motivation: To steal a Backup tape for 
personal gain 
Resources: Fake id 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Go to the Server room.  
Show a fake id and pretend to be an 
authorised new employee. Gain access to 
Server room (Server room access is only 
controled by security guard). Steal 
backup tapes of Order details.  
Impact:  Loss of confidentiality in Order 
details and loss of reliability in Backup 
tapes. 
IS Asset: Cloud service provider , DB03 
Vulnerability: Weak policies of user 
request handling in cloud.   
Threat Agent: A contract employee,  
Motivation: To sell Order details 
Resources: Social engineering skills, 
Organization email address 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Send an email to Cloud 
service provider by a group email 
address.  Mention about a external 
pentesting and request to change the 
firewall rules. Contract employee has 
spoofed the identiftiy of a legitimate user 
and therefore Cloud provider accepts the 
request to allow the traffic from a 
malicious ip.  Scan the DB03 .  Find a 
publicly available exploit and access 
Order details.  
Impact: Loss of confidentiality in Order 
details. Tarnish the reputation of the 
company.  
IS Asset: Employee (Intern) 
Vulnerability: Lack of security expereince and prone to social engineering 
Threat Agent: A malicious employee,  
Motivation: To plant a trojan for personal gain 
Resources: Social engineering skills 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Reach an intern and pretend that the malicious employee is trying 
to help.  Get DB credentials from the intern pretending that he is going to help.  Log 
into the DB03 with interns credentials and execute a malicious script.   
Impact: Loss of confidentiality in Order details.  Loss of reliability in DB03. 
T
a
m
p
er
in
g
  
 
(T
A
) 
 
IS Asset: Backup tapes, Server room 
Vulnerability: Insecurely stored Backup 
tapes 
Threat Agent: A malicious employee, 
Motivation: To destroy the Backup tapes 
for personal gain 
Resources: A close contact with Security 
Guard 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
IS Asset: DB03, Log server, 3rd party 
monitoring tool, Transmission protocol  
Vulnerability: Improper security 
transmission protocol in 3rd party 
monitoring tool  
Threat Agent: An attacker,  
Motivation: To cover the traces of a 
previous attack 
Resources: Knowledge about the 
vulnerable third-party cloud monitoring 
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Attack Method: Access the Server room 
by a social engineering attack on the 
Security guard. Insert backup tapes into a 
device and modify data of Backup tapes. 
Impact: Loss of Availability in Order 
details. Loss of integrity in Order details.  
Harm the data in Backup tape.  
tool  
Expertise Level: Intermediate /Advanced 
Attack Method: Find what is the 
integration software used to extract data 
from Log server to monitoring portal.  
Inject a malware to the plugin. Modify log 
files of Order details, so it will not be 
visible for monitoring.   
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality in Order 
details.  Loss of Integrity in Order 
details. Loss of trust towards 3rd party 
monitoring tool. 
R
ep
u
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
(R
E
) 
IS Asset: Log server, Employee  
Vulnerability: Unauthorized alerting 
mechanism in Log server  
Threat Agent: A bribed employee,  
Motivation: Personal Gain 
Resources: Company Infrastructure 
Knowledge  
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Go to the Server room .  
Plug a USB with a malware root-kit.  Get 
Access to Log server.  Remotely modify 
log files of Order details. 
Impact: Loss of confidentiality in Order 
details. Loss of integrity in Order details. 
Loss of trust towards Log server  
IS Asset: Backup Storage  
Vulnerability: Non-updated access 
privileges to internal users  
Threat Agent: An Insider attacker, 
Motivation: To fulfil a grudge for 
degrading his position  
Resources: Technical knowledge about 
backup mechanism, Has a user account 
to access Log servers 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Login to the Log server 
with his valid id.  Change the cron job 
schedule to avoid making backups.  
Clear the traces of his presence in the 
server . Logs during that period will be 
unavailable for later investigations.   
Impact: Loss of Availability in Order 
details Logs.   
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
 
IS Asset: Server room , Backup Tapes  
Vulnerability: Insecurely stored 
unencrypted backup tapes  
Threat Agent: A malicious employee,  
Motivation: Personal gain 
Resources: Backup Knowledge  
Expertise Level: Intermediate  
Attack Method: Employee with Server 
room access get in.  Clone the data in 
backup date.  Access data stored in plain 
text.  Sell Order details.   
Impact: Loss of confidentiality in Order 
details. Loss of trust towards data storing 
mechanism.   
IS Asset: Backup Storage  
Vulnerability: Improper hardware 
resource decommissioning in Backup 
Storage  
Threat Agent: A malicious Co-Tenant,  
Motivation: Personal fame  
Resources: Backup and Recovery 
knowledge, Forensic Tools  
Expertise Level: Intermediate  
Attack Method: Co-Tenant buys 
Advance Forensic Tool.  Execute the 
program and recover backup data files of 
DB03.  Break the encryption of files to 
see Order details.   
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality in Order 
details.  
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IS Asset: DB03 
Vulnerability: Improper application level user access control 
Threat Agent: An unauthorised insider, 
Motivation: To view all information related to Order details (personal gain) 
Resources: User access control knowledge ,  Company employee 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: An unauthorised insider discover that his user access role has been 
upgraded. Log into DB03 and retrieve Order details from DB03. 
Impact:  Loss of confidentiality in Order details and loss of trust towards DB03 
D
en
ia
l 
o
f 
S
er
v
ic
e 
 
IS Asset: Heating system, Server room 
Vulnerability: Weak heat monitoring 
mechanism 
Threat Agent: A malicious insider, 
Motivation: Personal gain (grudge) 
Resources: Knowledge about organisa-
tion 
Expertise Level: Beginner 
Attack Method: Access Server room.  
Disable heating system.  Server get over 
heated and malfunction.  It will lead to 
distruptiion of service.  
Impact: Loss of availability of Order 
details, loss of reliability of DB03 and 
harm the server of DB03.  
 
 
IS Asset: CDN Network, DB03 
Vulnerability: Improper request routing 
and response handling in CDN Network 
[52] [53] 
Threat Agent: A malicious Co-Tenant,  
Motivation: Personal gain 
Resources: Network and Routing 
knowledge                                           
Expertise Level: Advanced 
Attack Method: .  Co-Tenant 
manipulates forwarding process.  Create 
a forwarding loop inside CDN Network 
(Forwarding loop attack).  Forwarding 
loop will make one request process 
repeatedly. Make Unexpected massive 
resource consumption. These request 
will lead to DOS 
Impact: Loss of Availability in Order 
details 
E
le
v
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
P
ri
v
il
eg
e 
 
IS Asset: DB03, Camera 
Vulnerability: Improper USB access 
control 
Threat Agent: A malicious employee, 
Motivation: personal gain 
Resources: Technical knowledge and 
eqipment 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Go to the Server room.  
Plug in a rubber ducky to DB03 03.  Get 
remote access to the DB03.  Retrieve 
Order details which includes Personal 
information to find the revenue of the 
webshop from Order details. 
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality in Order 
details  
 
IS Asset: DB03, Shared Resource Pool  
Vulnerability: Improper resource 
isolation in Shared Resource Pool  
Threat Agent: A malicious co tenant, 
Motivation: Personal gain 
Resources: Virtualization knowledge 
Expertise Level: Advanced 
Attack Method: 
Tenant purchase multiple VMS from the 
cloud provider.  Get Infrastructure map 
and ip distribution via side channel attack.  
Exploit shared memory cache.  4.  Get ac-
cess to DB03 cache and expose Order de-
tails.  
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality in Order 
details.  Harm the reliability of shared 
resource pool.  
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IS Asset: phpMyAdmin interface 
Vulnerability: Misconfiguration in phpMyadmin interface of DB03 
Threat Agent: An attacker, 
Motivation: To access Order details and make a copy to sell in dark web (personal 
gain) 
Resources: Knowledge of application hacking 
Expertise Level: Intermediate 
Attack Method: Explore vulnerabilities related to phpmyadmin. Explore the 
location of phpMyadmin interface. Upload a backdoor via dump file function and 
escalate privileges  
Impact:  Loss of confidentiality in Order details and loss of trust in PayGate 
5.4 STRIDE-based Risk Analysis  
In the present, different methods are used by organisations to conduct a risk analysis.  A 
threat and a combination of vulnerabilities in system assets that could create an impact on 
assets [5] create security risks.  Security risk detection in early stages makes the risk treat-
ment procedure smooth.  Evolution is constant with the technological growth and adoption 
is needed to persist in the marketplace.  Security risk ids based on different threat categories 
are formulated as follows in table 9 
Table 9: STRIDE-based Security Risks in In-house and Cloud Infrastructure 
Threat 
Category 
In-house Security Risks Cloud Security Risks 
Spoofing SP. A. R1:  
An unauthorized employee with a 
means to access Server room to steal 
Backup tapes of Order details by 
exploiting the improper 
authentication mechanism in Server 
room leading to Loss of 
confidentiality in Order details and 
loss of reliability in Backup tapes. 
SP. B. R1:  
A contract employee with a means to sell 
Order details by using weak policies of 
user request handling  of Cloud service 
provider leading to loss of confidentiality 
in Order details and tarnish the reputation 
of the company. 
 
SP. B. R1:  
A malicious employee with a means to plant a trojan to extract Order details from 
DB03 by exploiting database credentials of an intern with a social engineering 
attack leading to loss of confidentiality in Order details and loss of reliability in 
DB03.  
Tampering TA. A. R2:  
A malicious employee with a means 
to destroy the Backup tapes by steal-
ing a token card because of the im-
proper access mechanism in Server 
room leading to loss of availability in 
Order details, loss of integrity in 
TA. B. R2:  
An attacker with a means to cover traces 
of a previous attack in Log server by 
exploiting improper security transmission 
protocol used in the third party monitoring 
tool integrated with the Log server leading 
to loss of confidentiality in Order details, 
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Order details and harm the data in 
Backup tape. 
loss of integrity in Order details and loss 
of trust towards 3rd party monitoring tool. 
No risk scenario  
Repudiation RE. A. R3:  
A bribed employee of In-house with a 
means to delete Order details logs to 
plant a malware to the physical device 
because of the misconfigured 
unauthorized alerting mechanism in 
Log server leading loss of 
confidentiality in Order details, loss 
of integrity in Order details and loss 
of trust towards Log server 1. 
RE. B. R3:  
An inside attacker with a means to change 
the Cron job schedule to avoid making 
backups by using non-updated access 
privileges to internal users leading to loss 
of confidentiality in Order detail logs and 
loss of availability in Order details logs.  
 
No Risk Scenario 
Information 
Disclosure 
IN. A. R4:  
A malicious in-house employee with 
a means to retrieve Order details to 
sell personal information in Dark web 
by using insecurely stored 
unencrypted backup tapes in Server 
room leading to loss of confidentiality 
of Order details, and loss of trust 
towards data storing mechanism.  
IN. B. R4:  
A malicious Co-Tenant with a motive to 
sell Order details by recovering deleted 
files by improper hardware resource 
decommissioning of Backup Storage 
leading to loss of confidentiality in Order 
details.  
IN. AB. R4:  
An unauthorized insider with a means to view all the information related to Order 
details from DB03 by using the improper user access role privileges of DB03 lead-
ing to loss of confidentiality of Order details and loss of reliability in DB03 access 
mechanism.  
Denial of 
Service 
DE. A. R5:  
An insider employee with a means to 
destroy the DB03 data store services 
by exploiting the heating system on 
the Server room not monitored 
leading to loss of availability of Order 
details, loss of reliability of DB03 and 
harm the server of DB03.  
DE. B. R5:  
A malicious Co-Tenant with a means to 
cause unexpected massive resource 
consumption by using improper request 
routing and response handling in CDN  
leading to loss of Availability in Order 
details , Harm the functionality of DB03 
and Harm the reputation of the PayGate 
organisation 
No risk scenario  
Elevation of 
privilege 
EL. A. R6:  
A malicious insider retrieve Order 
details by misleading the security 
personal with social enginneering 
attack in Server room and  getting 
EL. B. R6:  
A malicious co-tenant get access to Or-
der details by using improper resource 
isolation in Shared Resource Pool and 
get access to DB03 which leads to loss 
of confidentiality in Order details.   
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access to DB03 which leads to loss of 
confidentiality in Order details.  
EL. AB. R6:  
An attacker with a means to retrieve Order details gain access to phpMyAdmin 
interface of DB03 by exploiting a misconfiguration of DB03, leading to loss of 
confidentiality in Order details and loss of Webshop trust.  
 
Following two paragraphs illustrate two example scenarios from the table and  provides 
details explanations. 
Denial of service DE. A. R5 risk exist due to a vulnerability in the in-house heating system 
of the Server room.  The threat agent was capable to go to the Server room and damage the 
heating system which makes hardware in the Server room get overheated.  This risk does 
not exist in cloud because an employee in the PayGate will never have access to go to the 
cloud data center.  DE. AB. R5 explains an application level risk.  Data stores needs to have 
proper request handling to serve the legitimate request.  
Elevation of privilege security risk EL. A. R6 is an eliminated risk when the payment gate-
way system is migrated into the cloud.  PayGate employees will not know where the data is 
hosted in cloud and cloud data center physical access is strictly prohibited.  Therefore an 
employee will not be able to plug a device that could gain remote access in a cloud environ-
ment.  EL. B. R6 explains an escalation of privilege in cloud environment which is possible 
due to the Shared resource pools in cloud.  In an in-house non-virtualized infrastructure, 
shared resource pools cannot be see.  Therefore the risk will never exist in the in-house 
environment.  EL. AB. R6 is an application based security risk and the infrastructure that 
the application hosted will not eliminate the risk.  The vulnerability [56] exist in phpMyAd-
min interface will remain in in-house and cloud infrastructure.  
The tables are only to illustrate some example risk scenarios. No risk scenario means that a 
risk scenario is not presented in the table.  
5.5 Summary 
Threat analysis was performed on payment gateway system hosted in in-house infrastructure 
and cloud infrastructure.  Analysis presents how a threat event is formulated by a threat 
agent and threat method.  The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate risk scenarios based on 
STRIDE.   The analysis also shows what security risks will remain after migration. 
6 Validation  
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the correctness of the models, and the usefulness 
of the EA based approach used in the study to compare security risk analysis. The chapter 
contains the procedure used for the validation, results of the experts’ feedback and threats 
to validity. 
6.1 Validation Procedure 
The study is based on a real implementation of a payment gateway system and thus, internal 
users were selected based on the knowledge that they have towards PayGate as well as the 
experience in security risk management and cyber security. After selecting the group of 
sexperts, the desire towards participating in the validation process is verified to avoid faulty 
evaluation. Validation of the thesis started from asset identification and continued until the 
risk analysis.  
The asset identification and security objectives of each business asset was determined by 
meetings conducted with the internal group including the validation and verification of the 
identified context. The internal group of participants were reached via Skype calls, face to 
face meetings and emails. During the meetings, different users based on experience were 
involved including business analyst, production specialist, infrastructural engineers and 
product owners. First few meetings were held to obtain approvals to analyse the production 
environment and request information related to the payment gateway such as network maps, 
knowledge base documents etc.  Afterwards, interviews were conducted to gather the busi-
ness requirements and to identify the processes.  After modelling the EA and BPMN dia-
grams, network maps were checked by author to find if the visualisation of diagrams corre-
spond with real implementation. Subsequently, four people were reached to verify that EA 
models and BPMN model are accurate. During the meetings, they made feedback on cor-
recting the diagrams and these meetings were repeated until the experts in PayGate were 
satisfied with the correctness of the models. 
The STRIDE threat modelling approach was used to find out the security risks of in-house 
and cloud infrastructure. Firstly, security risk scenarios were written to present how security 
risks changes based on the infrastructure change. Secondly the scenarios were validated 
from company experts to find out if the scenarios reflect actual threats. Afterwards, skype 
interviews were initiated to internal and external experts to find out the usability of EA 
modelling for the comparison of security risk analysis.  Before each new meeting, an infor-
mation session was held regarding ISSRM approach, alignment with ISO 27005 and 
STRIDE. The objective of background information session is to get accurate feedback dur-
ing interviews and survey questions. Figure 17 presents that the validity is checked in two 
aspects such as correctness of models and usefulness of EA in security risk comparison. The 
two aspects were validated by external experts (External group) and internal experts (Inter-
nal experts). 
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Figure 17: Validation Criteria and Participant Groups 
 
6.2 Background of Participants 
Participants for the validation was mainly selected from PayGate due to the capability they 
have towards validating the correctness of the model. Six people out of ten were internal 
from the company itself. The reason for validating the procedure via an external group is to 
evaluate if this approach can be used in other organisations and to which extend they this 
solution useful in the industry. Table 10 presents the background of the participants that 
were interviewed as part of the validation process.  
Table 10: Background of Participants 
Expert 
ID 
Domain of 
the company Field of expertise Designation 
Number of 
experience 
(years) 
Geograph-
ical region/ 
country 
ExpNo1 Technology 
Cyber/ Security 
risk Director 20 
North Eu-
rope 
ExpNo2 Technology 
Cyber/ Security 
risk Consultant 15 
North Eu-
rope 
ExpNo3 Technology 
Cyber/ Risk/Pay-
ment Engineer 5 
North Eu-
rope 
ExpNo4 Technology 
Cyber/ Risk/Pay-
ment Manager 8 
North Eu-
rope 
ExpNo5 Technology 
Payment pro-
cessing Consultant 5 Europe 
ExpNo6 Payment 
Payment pro-
cessing 
Technical 
Manager  10 Europe 
ExpNo7 Payment Payment 
Business Ana-
lyst 3 Europe 
ExpNo8 Payment Security 
Security Engi-
neer- PCI 5 Australia 
ExpNo9 Banking Security RM Risk 10 Asia 
ExpNo 
10 
IT consulta-
tion Security Development 7 Asia 
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6.3 Validation of Correctness and Usefulness 
The correctness of models was validated by internal group using Skype and by face-face 
meetings. Here, the focus was towards validating the asset related concept of ISSRM. 
ExpNo6, ExpNo3, ExpNo4, ExpNo1 were mainly engaged in the model validation. The 
enterprise architecture was explained to the experts and discussed the need of having EA to 
compare security risks secondly the EA models were presented. The technology layer 
needed corrections because some information in network maps were outdated.  
Afterword’s the interdependencies and interrelationships were explained. Once when the 
experts confirmed the correctness of EA models, and it reflected the actual system a BPMN 
model of the payment transaction process was presented. Two out of six experts had 
knowledge about BPMN modelling. Therefore several suggestions for corrections were re-
quested by them. Some of the comments stated by ExpNo6 and ExpNo3 were “some tasks 
of the business process were missing”. ExpNo4 provided a detailed review about the errors 
that were against the BPMN logic which was useful to correct the remaining parts of the 
process. ExpNo1 checked the payment gateway system model as well as the EA model and 
mentioned “To the best of my knowledge this is accurate”. When the experts agreed that 
BPMN models corresponded to the actual business process, the security objectives were 
determined by Skype discussions. By the time of the interview, they did not have a list of 
security objectives and therefore discussion continued until an acceptable answer was pro-
vided. Related to EA validation, ExpNo6 sent an email stating “The architectural model 
corresponds completely with our current payment gateway system and matches the docu-
mentation we already have available.” and related to BPMN diagram, “The BPMN contains 
the most important business process relevant for our business. A BPMN that covers all 
processes would be far more complex and as a result more difficult to read“ comment was 
written in the email after the interview. However the study has only considered modelling 
only the payment transaction process therefore the comment stating about the complexity 
does not have any effect in the study. For remaining internal employees, the PayGate models 
for cloud infrastructure and in-house infrastructure were presented after providing a briefing 
about ISSRM and EA modelling. Afterwards, different threat scenarios based on STRIDE 
and security risk scenario formulations were presented to each experts. Some asked ques-
tions such as “why it is categorised as an eliminated risk and why not in in-house”. Answers 
were provided during the discussion presenting examples.  
The usefulness of the approach is validated by both internal and external groups. An intro-
duction was made about objectives and EA modelling to external experts before the valida-
tion. Furthermore, the models were presented with a brief introduction of the ISSRM.  The 
correctness of the models were not evaluated by external group, as a payment gateway sys-
tem in another company can have a different model. Therefore, after explaining the proce-
dure two questions were asked to evaluate the usability of the approach. Same questions 
were presented to the internal group via email, but did not repeat about the approach as they 
have already confirmed the models. Regarding the usability of the approach ExpNo1 said 
“EA in Risk analysis is very impressive and it is indeed a complex task”.  Since this is an 
interview based validation, I asked the suitability of such approach in an enterprise.  The 
answer was “ finding resources with EA capability and analysis is rare and the modelling 
process can be time-consuming, but when the model is completed, this will indeed be helpful 
for organisations to not only to capture the changes of pre and post-migration changes but 
an architectural installation to the same infrastructure”.  ExpNo6, the Technical Manager 
of PayGate has been engaged a lot in the validation process by providing feedback and ac-
curacy checks of the models.  His final comment regarding the work was “Approach is very 
impressive” Regarding the usefulness of models to compare security risk analysis of two 
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infrastructures , he mentioned that “EA will be indeed useful and they have never had an 
idea about using EA modelling for their system to find the interdependencies and a great 
visualization”. ExpNo 9 and ExpNo 10 commented that “approach is good, but there will 
be practical issues when modelling some systems due to over complexity” which is accepta-
ble. 
Table 11 presents the questions given to participants of the validation. The experts were 
provided what is meant by 1 -10 in the scale field. Where 1 could be “Not at all”, “Not 
useful”, “Not easy at all” “highly unlikely” and “Very bad”. Ten in the rating scale presented 
“Totally agree”, “Very useful”, “Very easy”, “Very likely”, “and Very good”. (When 
providing the questions to experts, the explanation of the numeric values in scale was given 
one by one which is only relevant to the question to avoid ambiguousness. Question 1 to 4 
are based on validation the correctness and question 5-7 are based on evaluating the useful-
ness of using EA modelling to compare security risk analysis. 
 
Table 11: Validation Questions and Answers 
Question Scale Average 
1. How easy to understand the ISSRM approach used for Risk 
Management? 1-10 9.16 
2. How likely do you agree with the BPMN Model? 1-10 9.75 
3. How much do you think Architecture Model correspond with 
the actual system? 1-10 8 
4. How easy it is to understand the relationship of business layer 
and architecture layer with the model? 1-10 8 
5. How useful is the approach used in the study to identify 
system assets that pose threats and find security risks? 1-10 9.89 
6. How likely do you think that Enterprise architecture (EA) 
based modelling can help to identify system assets than a 
BPMN diagram?  1-10 9.75 
7. How you rate the suitability of the approach used in the study 
to compare security risk analysis using STRIDE? 1-10 7.5 
 
6.4 Threats to Validity of Research 
The research work was validated by internal and external experts. However, there can be 
threats which could challenge and changes the outcome of the validation results. The group of 
people were selected based on the experience. During the interview, background knowledge 
was given about ISSRM and STRIDE to have a better outcome and to avoid results based on 
misunderstanding. Also the payment gateway system is a real-world implementation and the 
accuracy of the models can be compared with the current network maps and experts feedback 
to find the correctness. Although, still the results can be subjective and can vary upon below 
facts.  
 Change the group of internal and external experts 
 Convincing power of the interviewer 
 The mutual interest about the topic 
 Level of understandability about the questions 
 The correctness of the questions asked during the interview and survey 
 The same question formulated in a different way 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter concludes the validation of the research with experts’ feedback. Two user 
groups were involved in the validation such as internal and external. The correctness of the 
models that the assets were elicited and the usefulness of the procedure introduced in the 
work is validated. Improvements to the models were made based on the suggestions pro-
vided by the business analyst and technical product manager’s viewpoint. Most of the ex-
perts provided positive feedback on the EA model based procedure used to compare security 
risks between two infrastructures. The company of the case study would like to continue 
this work and make an implementation of EA based modelling to the risk analysis process. 
The results presented in this section can change based on threats to validity.   
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7 Conclusion 
Chapter 7 focuses on providing answers to the research questions, limitation of the research 
work done, conclusions of the work and future work which will help a researcher to continue 
from the finding presented. 
7.1 Limitations 
In this study, enterprise architecture modelling is used to show the abstract level of a real-
world payment gateway system. The cloud infrastructure that was modelled using Archi-
Mate is generalization of the information collected from major cloud providers and the 
model in Threat Modelling for Cloud Data Center Infrastructures [33] research paper.  A 
real-world cloud infrastructure can have different components.  Also, in this research only 
the IaaS model is considered. But the results can be varied if the same approach is used on 
SaaS and PaaS. 
The payment gateway system presented is modelled based on the interviews from an exist-
ing company.  Payment gateway system integration might not be the same for another com-
pany therefore it is subjective.  
7.2 Answers to Research Questions 
In this study, the main research question is: What procedure can be used to find differ-
ences of security risks in the in-house infrastructure and cloud infrastructure? Before 
any comparison, a study about the system and the infrastructures needed. To help answer 
the main research question, it is broken down into three research questions.  Study starts to 
answer:  
RQ 1: What are the architectural differences between in-house infrastructure and 
cloud infrastructure? 
The selected study is based on an actual existing payment gateway.  Therefore, an analysis 
of the company in-house infrastructure was performed before modelling system via Archi-
Mate. The separation of layers and inter-dependency in ArchiMate was used to bring real-
world scenario to an abstract visualization to find the connections of each components. A 
comparison of ArchiMate diagrams presented that there are changes in user groups, appli-
cation layer and technology layer. The further analysis presented that in-house has a non-
virtualized environment and manual methods for securing, while cloud architecture dis-
played the virtualisation components and the user group changes due to the fact that cloud 
provider also has access to the environment.  
RQ 2: What are the business assets and supporting information system assets? 
From the enterprise architecture models derived in chapter 03, payment transaction process 
was selected as the primary study among the four business processes that were discovered 
in the business layer of both infrastructures.  Enterprise architecture model technology layer 
is an abstract view of the PayGate system.  BPMN diagram did not capture all the 
architectural components visible even in the first level abstract. Therefore payment 
transaction process was modelled using BPMN language to elicit business assets from the 
payment transaction process.  Payment transaction process in ArchiMate consisted of three 
sub-processes: Order Checkout, Fraud Verification and Transaction acceptance.  Each was 
presented in the thesis separately to have better visibility.  From the BPMN diagram, 6 
business assets were derived.  The security objectives of the business assets are presented 
using the confidentiality, availability and integrity properties.  Security objective of each 
business asset was captured by conducting interviews with the Technical product manager 
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of PayGate to understand how important the asset is to the organisation. One business asset 
was choosen  and the technology layer expansion was modelled again for that particular 
asset using ArchiMate as a second level abstraction to elicit IS assets from in-house 
infrastructure and cloud infrastructure. System assets of cloud which support the Order 
details business asset are virtualisation based technologocal components, cloud service 
provider. In-house infrastrcuture model consisted of security guard which supports to 
protect information in the server room, facilities that support to protect the secuirty 
objectives of order details. 
RQ 3: What security risks change when a payment gateway system migrates from in 
in-house to cloud infrastructures? 
Objective of the work is to perform a comparison of security risks in in-house and cloud 
infrastructure based on a threat-driven approach using STRIDE.  Due to the complex nature 
of the study only one business asset was chosen.  Second abstraction of ArchiMate level 
diagram is modelled to show the interdependency of one business asset with the associated 
technology layer. Same procedure was followed for the cloud infrastructure.  IS assets that 
support the Order details business asset is used to find the threats and the differences of 
risks.  Before identifying IS asset for a threat scenarios, decision was made based on:  
 Risk comparison in each STRIDE category should consider only one business asset.  
The reasoning behind the restrictions are, a risk can either eliminate completely, risk level 
increase, risk level decrease or risks can be introduced with the migration. First, only a lim-
ited number of IS assets were considered to find scenarios. The scenarios were chosen based 
on STRIDE categories. The results presented that security risk result can be categorise into 
three: new risk, eliminated risk and remaining risk. The security gap is the risk changes that 
can happen based on the infrastructure migration for a specific business object. This expla-
nation shows how to find the risks in two different infrastructure and how it could be cate-
gorised based on the STRIDE approach.   
Most of the risk scenarios presented in in-house are based on physical attacks. Cloud based 
unique risk scenarios are mostly due to the virtualisation environment. Therefore in-house 
physical security risks are eliminated in cloud and virtualisation based risks will be newly 
introduce. However this does not mean cloud has no physical attacks. But security risks by 
internal employees in PayGate will not be in cloud due to the distributed nature of data in 
cloud and cloud data centre inaccessibility. Security risks in applications that are hosted in 
both environments are categorised as remaining risks because code based, web application 
based security risks will not change depends on the infrastructure components. But the pos-
sibility of threat agent exploiting the system can be highly unlikely based on deferent de-
fence mechanisms used in different infrastructures. 
7.3 Conclusion 
In organisations, business process modelling is done by a business analyst.  There is an 
isolation between the technical user group and non-technical user group.  Asset identifica-
tion for RA based on BPMN diagrams might contains drawbacks such as unidentified IS 
assets.  Therefore EA modelling is used in this study to show the mapping of business layer 
to Technology layer to have a better visibility of infrastructural components and the interre-
lationships of each layers.  EA model in this work has brought an abstract of an existing 
scenario in a simplified manner.  Asset identification is an important step as unidentified 
assets can carry unknown risk.  
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In conclusion, the analysis shows that EA model helps to identify IS assets that would have 
been neglected in a business process diagram.  It also helps to compare and capture the 
differences in architecture.  ISSRM is well aligned with EA models and ease asset identifi-
cation.  Changes to architectural components in models helps to identify IS assets that could 
be a threat and pose a risk to an organisation.  Along with an infrastructure migration, a risk 
can eliminate, introduced, an existing risk can either increase or decrease.  Risk has been 
identified for both infrastructures based on STRIDE threat approach.  Validation of the work 
has been presented by interviewing experts in the organisation that PayGate is hosted and 
few external opinion about the suitability of the approach taken in the study.  
 
7.4 Future Work 
The approach used in the work to conduct a comparative security risk analysis based on two 
different infrastructures can be further developed as a method.   
EA modelling can be used to find the interrelationships and interdependencies of business 
to IT layer.  In present, availability of infrastructure modelling automated tools are limited.  
A prototype or an automated open source tool would identify the risk level of the infrastruc-
ture layer will bring this research to the next level by providing a qualitative risk gap analysis 
using risk matrix.  Numeric value of the security risk will ease the comparison process. 
There have been only limited number of research to conduct risk analysis based on enter-
prise architecture.  Applicability of enterprise architecture in other security risk methods 
will improve the research area of EA modelling usability in security risk analysis.  Also, 
same approach used in the study can be applied on a different enterprises planning to migrate 
to find the security risk gap using a different threat modelling approach.  
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